way to implement fiscal policy and the effects of its coordination within a monetary union. Those studies focus on scenarios where a new EMU member would lose the possibility of using monetary policy for the stabilization of country-specific shocks, thus being in a situation where fiscal policy is the only remaining instrument. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) try to capture some hypothetical interactions between several governments and a common central bank, in which the governments have the possibility to raise debt and the common central bank sets unified monetary policy for all member countries. Beetsma et al. (2001) discuss the role of national fiscal policies in stabilizing country-specific economic disturbances in the EMU and international spillover effects from such stabilization policies. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) investigate the interdependence of fiscal policies empirically, concluding that the fiscal policy plans of large countries affect those of small countries, but the influence does not move in the other direction. Ferre (2008) points out that a broader coordination of fiscal policies among the EMU member countries should be sought because countries will benefit individually and collectively. However, there could be occasions where one of the countries would choose not to follow a broad coordination, even though collectively they would prefer the broad coordinationʼs outcome. If a country loses more benefit individually than it can win collectively through fiscal policy coordination, the country should not follow the monetary unionʼs instructions to coordinate fiscal policy among members.
In our study we focus on the individual national outcome resulting from fiscal policy instructions given to all member countries by the monetary union. We point out how fiscal policy restrictions can affect developing and developed countries differently, because their fiscal policy, especially government expenditure, can play a different role. The main purpose of our paper is to examine the implications of one-dimensional fiscal policy instructions for the growth of EMU member countries. In the following section, we employ a growth model with optimal fiscal policy to define reasons for the balance between public and private capital in a developed country, and different effects that one-dimensional fiscal policy restrictions have on developing and developed countries. In section III, we empirically analyze conditions of public and private capital and their effects on GDP in EMU member countries. We focus on the bottom four countries in terms of GDP per capita. We regard these bottom four countries as developing countries, relative to other eight member countries, and examine whether one-dimensional fiscal policy coordination prevents smooth development of economic growth in these four countries. In section IV, we conclude our research and outline a number of issues that need further research.
Ⅱ．Theoretical Approach
In this section, we introduce a growth model that portrays optimal fiscal policy through a relationship between public and private capital on optimal economic growth. With this model, we try to determine a country-specific outcome from the fiscal policy instructions given to all monetary union members. We also try to connect this growth model to Convergence Hypothesis, to understand the difficulties of one-dimensional fiscal policy coordination for multiple countries.
The theory of economic growth explained by Barro (1990) , Ravikumar (1994, 1999) , Futagami et al. (1993) and others analyzed relationships between national fiscal policy and optimal economic growth.
The theory of optimal growth by Arrow and Kurz (1970) specifies a condition of public and private capital goods for the existence of a stationary solution in the dynamics of an optimal growth path. With regard to these studies, we point out the ratio between public and private capital as a key indicator for optimal fiscal policy.
In our study, we adopt fundamentally the simple growth model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) to analyze the effects of public investment Difficulties of One-Dimensional Fiscal Policy in the EMU（DOI・OOHAMA) on infrastructure and to explore the political implications of capital accumulation in the public and private sectors. In respect to their specification, we assume that investments in infrastructure may be viewed as expenditures on publicly provided inputs such as roads and highways, water supply, airports, law enforcement, education, etc. To simplify our model, we assume no spillover effect among monetary union members. The model framework is hereby described.
Assume that the economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely-lived households and a government. The population growth rate is assumed to be zero and the size of the population is denoted by N.
Each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically and is valued as a single non-storable good by the utility function,
where β∈0,1 is the discount factor and c is the consumption of the representative household at time t.
Each household faces the following budget constraint and initial condition,
c,k≥0,t=0,1,…,
given k,p,w,r,z,τ
where p is the price of consumption/investment goods, w is the wage rate, r is the rental rate on capital, τ is the tax rate, and z is the householdʼs share of profits. In this model, each household owns an initial stock of private capital k but the private capital depreciates at 100 percent and evolves according to
where i is the representative householdʼ s investment. Each household maximizes eq.
(1) subject to eqs. (2)-(5).
The representative firmʼs problem is choosing capital and labor with the production function to maximize its profit.
where k is the private capital, l is the number of hired labors. G and K are the aggregate stocks of infrastructure (Government Expenditure) and private capital and L is the aggregate labor input. G   is the aggregate stock of infrastructure available to all firms and is subject to congestion.
A competitive equilibrium, named the π-competitive equilibrium (π-CE), 
and the initial stock of infrastructure G is exogenous. There are tradeoffs for fiscal policy as follows. A higher tax at time t implies lower current consumption and saving. A higher income tax implies more investment in public capital, which leads to a higher future output. The higher tax also Difficulties of One-Dimensional Fiscal Policy in the EMU（DOI・OOHAMA) yields the benefit of reducing congestion by providing a disincentive for private capital accumulation.
Using the unique solutions of this optimization exercise, the optimal public policy under the conditions of π-CE is determined by choosing
kG given.
To derive the optimal tax rate in this model, we reform the aforementioned objective function to the value function below to employ dynamic programming.
To solve this objective function (Bellmanʼs Equation) we use a recursive approach as follows :
where D is constant. To solve this function, we can find the optimal policy function for the tax rate as
where public capital depreciates at 100 percent in each period. In other words, in this model, we are focusing on the flows of private and public capital. We put this solution into eqs. (9-1) and (9-2), and thus derive the optimal ratio of public to private capital as follows :
Equation (13) implies that the optimal ratio of public to private capital should be constant at a certain level with given parameters, when the government chooses the optimal policy for the tax rate.
We can derive the evolution of private capital from eq. (13) as
For α+1−ρθ∈0,1, we understand from eq. (14) that the dynamic map (k vs. k) is increasing, strictly concave, and has a slope that eventually declines to zero. As a result, the sequence {k} monotonically converges to a steady state level k  independent of initial stocks k and
G.
In addition to this growth model, we assume decreasing returns to reproducible factors for the production function. The evolution of private capital in this case is not as straightforward. If we assume that the growth rates of public and private capital should be equal through eq.
(13) and the production function has a decreasing return in eq. (14), then the growth rates of both types of capital converge to the level of those countries with the most developed economy. Even in reality, it is natural to assume a production function with a decreasing return ; therefore we will accept α+1−ρθ<1 in eq. (14). Consequently, this assumption of Difficulties of One-Dimensional Fiscal Policy in the EMU（DOI・OOHAMA) decreasing return could be related to the Convergence Hypothesis.
The Convergence Hypothesis elucidated by Baumol (1986) suggests that levels of per capita output will converge in the long term. We assume that the mechanism of the Convergence Hypothesis will be accelerated through the monetary union because of free mobility of production factors among member countries. Therefore the hypothesis works even in the short term within a monetary union. The mechanism is as follows. If a less developed country has the potential to catch up to the economic level of a country with the most advanced technology, the less developed country (developing) will grow faster than a more developed country through technological transfer. In other words, developing countries could imitate the technologies of developed countries, which is much easier and faster than developing new frontier technologies in the most advanced countries. We mention the "potential" to catch-up, which mainly refers to the degree of enhancement of infrastructure. If a developing country has not invested sufficiently in infrastructure, it obligatorily spends extra capital, especially public capital, on the infrastructure in order to attain the catching-up potential of the economy. Developed countries have already invested in their infrastructure, and therefore their public investment has only a small impact on their growth. Hence, their growth rate will be stabilized. Marrero (2008) concurs that a developed country tends to stabilize its growth rate. His findings suggest that this trend should be accompanied by an optimal strategy that reduces the share of output devoted to public investment.
These conditions lead per capita output to drop anchor at a particular level as a steady state. If we set the same parameters for all countries in our model, because of a common market for all member countries in a monetary union, all countries should reach an identical level of per capita output. In brief, the levels of per capita output converge to the level of the most developed country. If the levels of economies thus converge, an optimal fiscal policy will become common to all member countries. How-ever, if one member is a developing country, whose economy is far below the level of developed countries in the monetary union, we need to set different parameters in our model, and therefore, the optimal fiscal policy for the developing country must be different from those in developed countries. Because of the Convergence Hypothesis, a fiscal policy for the purpose of catching-up is effective in developing countries. According to this idea, public capital has much more significant meaning in developing countries than in developed countries. Therefore, it is imaginable that developing countries should give more density to public capital than developed countries. In consequence, through eq. 13, we assume that optimal capital conditions are different between developed and developing countries, leading to their respective optimal fiscal policies as follows :
With regard to one-dimensional fiscal policy instructions in a monetary union, we can define the following case. If the instructions are composed of optimal fiscal policy for developed countries in the monetary union, capital conditions will become as follows :
G k DevelopingCountries=Ineffective=NotConst.
As a result of our theoretical approach, it is clear that an optimal strategy of the fiscal policy commonly exists only for developed countries, because the same fiscal policy does not fit the conditions for developing countries, even when there are identical market conditions within a monetary union. 
Ⅲ．Empirical Analysis
In this section, we analyze empirically the conditions between public and private capital and their effects on GDP of EMU members, using data from 1995 to 2007. According to our theoretical approach, we assume that conditions between public and private capital should not be stable in developing countries. In this aspect, we calculate the ratio of government expenditure (public capital) to private sector investment (private capital)
for the bottom four countries. We regard data related to collective consumption expenditure of all levels of government as government expenditure, and gross fixed capital formation as private sector. In partic- Based on eqs. 16 and 17, we can assume that the convergence criteria controlled the levels of this ratio for all member countries.
Figures 3 and 4 show the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP in the top eight and bottom four countries. In Figure 3 , we see a converging trend to 20％ for the ratio among the top eight countries. To clarify the converging trend, we employ coefficient of variation (CV) for the top eight and all 12 countries in Table 2 . The CV is a normalized measure of dispersion in a probability distribution. state under constant conditions of economic growth, and hence, their ratio of private capital to GDP is converging to a certain level. Because of the influence of the bottom four countries, the CV for all the 12 countries is increasing. In Figure 4 , we can not find such a converging trend. Here we define the not-converging trend of this ratio for the bottom four countries.
To examine the correlation between capital flows (gross fixed capital formation as investment, and collective consumption expenditure of gen- 
Ⅳ．Concluding Remarks
The main purpose of our study was to examine the individual national outcomes of one-dimensional fiscal policy instructions given to all EMU member countries. In our theoretical approach, we could define different effects of one-dimensional fiscal policy on developing and developed countries, because government expenditure can play a more important role for infrastructure improvement in developing than in developed countries. On one hand, developed countries have stable economic growth condition. On the other hand, developing countries can grow faster and stronger to catch up their economic levels through technological transfer, even though they do not have stable economic growth conditions. If economic levels are truly converging within all member countries of the EMU, onedimensional fiscal policy instructions and policy coordination could affect all member countries equally and thus effectively. However, if one countryʼs economy is far below the level of the other (developed) countries, with its infrastructure consolidated less sufficiently than theirs, it is possible that fiscal policy restrictions will prevent its smooth economic growth.
According to our empirical approach, we found that four member countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) have trends toward convergence of their ratio of government expenditure to GDP, but no such converging trends for their ratio of private capital to GDP. In addition, the results of our regression analysis show that these bottom four countries show weaker effects of private and public capital on GDP than seen in the other eight countries. As a result, we conclude that the bottom four countries have not reached the economic level of the top eight countries ; therefore, identical fiscal policy instructions for the entire EMU will lead to disturbances of the capital conditions and economic growth in the bottom four countries.
Finally, we wish to address issues for our future research. In this study, we employed a simple theoretical model without considering the collective benefit and spillover effects from fiscal policies of other monetary union members. For example, we need to involve the effects of the Structural Fund for economic and social cohesion in EU, in which developing countries will be supported for their regional development by the fund of EU. It is possible that a country will lose individual benefits from fiscal policy coordination but win overall by gaining more benefits from collective aspects. We should incorporate collective benefits in our theoretical model and set up spillover effects in a concrete form to extend our empirical analysis. In our empirical analysis the expression on the demand side was used, because the analysis on the supply side was difficult without forcible settings on the key parameters. However, the model setting in our empirical analysis is one of the most relevant assignments to develop our future research. Moreover, we need to grasp the time lag in developing countries between government expenditure for infrastructure and its effects on growth.
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